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This study aims to discuss the existing contentious recall policy that becomes the legitimate reason to 
replace or retire the House member proposed by political parties. The discussion also examines to what 
extent recall, in practice, whether it enables the promotion of Indonesia's anti-corruption agenda. Through 
the recall, political parties can withdraw their members in the House, either in the form of dismissal or 
changing positions before the end of the term of office of members who sit in the House of representatives. 
This study finds that the existing recall policy impedes democracy and negates how to eradicate 
corruption in Indonesia. As a result, the current policy needs an option to ensure that recall will work as 
it is expected. Therefore, this alternative should include constituents to propose recall, which will disrupt 
the existing parties' domination, resulted in a more participatory system, and it reflects the more reciprocal 
ways to link people, parties, and the House in Indonesian politics. The judiciary's role is another essential 
aspect to highlight, in which the process and settlement of the recall may involve the Constitutional Court 
as the hub of the political and constitutional settlement. 
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In the global discourse of democracy in post-colonial states, Indonesia has become one 
example for which its continuities and changes have attracted scholars to have an in-
depth study to what extent it inspires and represents other countries in adopting 
democracy as the triumph. In practice, Indonesia has crucial challenges in maintaining 
democracy, mainly when it deals with how democracy enables to develop as an inclusive 
system, by providing adequate participation in decision-making rather than the existing 
system that builds up the inclusiveness centered by the political elites. 
This study acknowledges that representative democracy will work well as long as 
the reciprocity has been complied with among people, representatives, and political 
parties.1 While people's representatives are expected to represent people’s interests,2 
political parties in Indonesia tend to keep the elite scenario with the absence of the 
sufficient vertical control in ensuring the work of democracy.3 Therefore, it is undeniable 
that Indonesia's current representative democracy is inefficient, lacks transparency, and 
encourages rampant corruptive practices.  
In addressing the poor performance and linkage among these three elements, this 
study discusses the existing contentious recall policy that becomes the legitimate reason 
to replace or retire the House member proposed by political parties. This discussion also 
examines to what extent recall in practice promotes the anti-corruption agenda in 
Indonesia. Through the recall, political parties can withdraw their members in the 
House, either in the form of dismissal or changing positions before the end of the term of 
office of members who sit in the representative institution.4 Political parties' limited 
transparency and extensive power make this recall shift the people's loyalty to political 
parties rather than the people5 even though recall initially is intended to monitor the 
House members' monitoring mechanism in carrying out their tasks.6 
 
1  Dimitri Landa & Ryan Pevnick, “Representative Democracy as Defensible Epistocracy” (2020) 114:1 
American Political Science Review 1–13 at 5. 
2  Jared Sonnicksen, “Dementia and representative democracy: Exploring challenges and implications for 
democratic citizenship” (2016) 15:3 Dementia 330–342 at 334. 
3  The vertical control mechanism asserts the people’s control against the representative formed as the 
consequence of constitutional democracy as outlined in Article 1 paragraph (2) and (3) of the 
Indonesian Constitution. 
4  Muhamad Aljebra Aliksan Rauf, Marten Bunga & Hardianto Djanggih, “Hak Recall Partai Politik 
Terhadap Status Keanggotaan Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat dalam Sistem Ketatanegaraan Indonesia” 
(2018) 7:4 Jurnal Magister Hukum Udayana (Udayana Master Law Journal) 443–455 at 443. 
5  In practice, recall becomes the political parties' power, as outlined in Article 239 of the revised 
Parliament Act 2014. The absence of the recall's parameter, therefore, this mechanism is often 
instrumented as the political tool to ensure member's loyalty to parties. 
6  Shevierra Danmadiyah, Xavier Nugraha & Sayyidatul Insiyah, “A Party’s Recall Right in the Concept 
of Democratic Country” (2019) 19:2 Syariah: Jurnal Hukum dan Pemikiran 151–158 at 152. 





Previous studies regarding this topic examined the democratic aspects of recall,7 
the relationship between recall and democracy,8 decision-making of recall,9 and the legal 
consequences of recall monopolized by parties.10 Instead, there is a lack of research 
examining the intersections between recall and the anti-corruption agenda, assumed as 
the political conundrum to maintain the superiority of the political elite in Indonesian 
democracy, as this examination will be elaborated in this study.  
This study comprises three parts of the discussion. The first part will provide an 
overview of the relationship between political parties, representative democracy, and 
recall in Indonesia, as the continuum analysis under the current Indonesian political 
system. This part will also examine how corruption is handled in Indonesia about the 
recall. The second part will explore the relationship between recall policy and the 
paradox to eradicate corruption in Indonesia. In the last part, this study will discuss how 
to build a participatory recall to promote eradicating corruption in Indonesia. 
 
 
II. POLITICAL SYSTEM AND RECALL IN INDONESIA 
A. Representative Democracy in the Indonesian Political System 
The 1998 reformation has started a new chapter for Indonesia's recent political and 
economic trajectories in the more liberalized and globalized system. Amongst the global 
shift that encourages the more transparent polity, Indonesia has made a considerable 
improvement by reforming the existing constitutional system from 1999 to 2002. When 
the final draft of the constitutional revision was agreed, it had become the cornerstone 
of Indonesia's constitutional system for which many precede scholars in the times 
assumed Indonesia had the better and impactful system for sustainable democracy. This 
reform also reflected the previous government's poor governance considered to 
proliferate the root of rampant corruptive practices.11 In this period, the reform 
committed to rejuvenating democracy and the rule of law, including the commitment to 
handling corruption cases.12 
As a result of the reform, the system shifted from parliamentary to a constitutional 
democracy. The current system rejects the monopolized people's representation by the 
People's Consultative Assembly or Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR).13 Hence, 
 
7  Danmadiyah, Nugraha & Insiyah, supra note 6. 
8  Maulana Akmal Zikri & M Zuhri, “Tinjauan Yuridis Tentang Hak Recall Oleh Partai Politik 
Berdasarkan Konsep Kedaulatan Rakyat Dalam Lembaga Perwakilan Di Indonesia” (2018) 2:2 Jurnal 
Ilmiah Mahasiswa Bidang Hukum Kenegaraan 358–368. 
9  Iswatul Hasanah, “Recall Partisipatif (Paradigma Asas Musyawarah Mufakat dalam Mekanisme 
Pemberhentian Anggota Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Republik Indonesia)” (2014) 1:1 Kumpulan Jurnal 
Mahasiswa Fakultas Hukum. 
10  Hadi Shubhan, “Recall: Antara Hak Partai Politik dan Hak Berpolitik Anggota Parpol” (2006) 3:4 
Jurnal Konstitusi 3057. 
11  Harold A Crouch, Political Reform in Indonesia After Soeharto (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010) 
at 114. 
12  Ibid at 118. 
13  Article 1 (2) of the 1945 Constitution (original) stated, “Sovereignty rests in the hands of the people and is fully 
implemented by the People's Consultative Assembly.” 
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political supremacy should be under the constitution rather than under this institution. 
It also considers that although the MPR is idealized as an institution representing 
people's interests, it shifted to express political and elite interests in reality.14  Therefore, 
constitutional democracy is an effective way to ensure democracy consistent with the 
ideal and commonly agreed term: "the government of the people, by the people, for the people" that 
must follow the constitution.15 
Indeed, by referring to Pancasila, Indonesia's basic philosophy, Indonesian 
democracy's design refers to representative democracy.16 This system is often justified 
different from the so-called direct democracy for which the people are directly involved 
in the political process without representation.17 In a representative democracy, the vital 
aspect is how to build relationships between people and representatives in the House.18 
Consequently, House members should act as desired by the people by virtue of 
accountability. While on the other hand, they also can be more independent of various 
people's interests.19 To be sure, participation in modern democracy remains vital. 
Representative democracy has developed into participatory democracy interpreted as 
government power that comes from the people, for the people, by the people, and 
together with the people.20  
Participatory democracy is defined as a mechanism that allows individual 
participation by citizens in political and policy decisions that affect their lives, and 
especially it is conducted directly rather than through elected representatives.21 In 
dealing with the discussion mentioned above on democracy, political parties are required 
in a representative democracy. In the words of Giovanni Sartori, a political party is a 
political group that participates in general elections, which are used as a means of placing 
candidates to occupy public positions. Whereas in principle, political parties aim to gain 
political power by constitutional means in implementing their programs.22 
In a democratic country like Indonesia, political parties have important functions. 
Political parties are a means of political communication, political socialization, political 
recruitment, and conflict management. First, as political communication, it can be 
interpreted that political parties function in disseminating government plans and 
policies and as a link between those who govern and those who are governed. This 
 
14  Ramlan Surbakti et al, Membangun Sistem Kepartaian Pluralisme Moderat: Menyederhanakan Jumlah Partai 
Politik (Kemitraan bagi Pembaruan Tata Pemerintahan, 2011) at 19. 
15  Yasmin Dawood, “The Fragility of Constitutional Democracy” (2017) 77 Md L Rev 192 at 196. 
16  Syafriadi Syafriadi, “Pelaksanaan Demokrasi dalam Sistem Ketatanegaraan Indonesia” (2017) 1:1 UIR 
Law Review 25–38 at 26. 
17  Fathan Ali Mubiina, “Pola Hubungan Fraksi dengan Lembaga Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Republik 
Indonesia Pasca-Reformasi” (2020) 8:1 Diktum: Jurnal Ilmu Hukum 36–69 at 41. 
18  Landa & Pevnick, supra note 1 at 6. 
19  Mubiina, supra note 17 at 44. 
20  Ibid. 
21  Participatory democracy has become a model for the collective decision-making that integrates direct 
and indirect democracy elements. The people have the power to decide the proposal policy while their 
representatives have a role in implementing it. Henry Campbell Black et al, Black’s law dictionary (West 
Group St. Paul, MN, 1999) at 246. 
22  Miriam Budiardjo, Dasar-dasar Ilmu Politik (Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2003) at 404–405.   





function is essential as the bridge in responding to people’s interests.23 Second, as 
political socialization, it is related to conveying political culture, norms, and values over 
generations.24 This function relates to efforts to create an image to obtain the public 
interest. Besides, it is also in the context of providing education for its members to have 
awareness and responsibility as citizens and place their personal interests under the 
national interest.25 Fourth, as political recruitment, it is closely related to leadership 
selection, both internal leadership in parties and national leadership.26 Fifth, as managing 
conflict related to helping problems of differences in each society that has potential 
conflicts.27 
Persily and Cain argue that several main principles must be considered in 
regulating political parties.28 First, electoral system symbiosis, in which the 
constitutionality of rules regarding political parties depends on other related legal rules 
regarding the method of nomination and restrictions on electoral competitiveness.29 
Second, party autonomy in which the rule determines membership of parties, 
organizations, or nomination procedures must be seen as disturbing freedom of 
association.30 Third, anti-paternalism in which every national interest that can be 
achieved through party regulation for its benefit cannot be used as a justification for state 
rules regarding political parties.31 Fourth, equal treatment in which the law gives 
disproportionate privileges and burdens on certain parties means violating the same 
protection provisions.32 Fifth, electoral influence in which political parties that show 
their ability to influence election results have the right to become the party to be 
elected.33 
 
B. Does Recall Hinder the Anti-Corruption Agenda? 
Recall literally means official withdrawal. Generally, recall is also known as recall 
election, recall referendum, or representative recall. A recall is used as a procedure to 
"lower" an elected official through direct elections before the official's tenure has ended.34 
As for Mahfud MD defines, recall is the right to replace members of a consultative 
organization or representative from their position so that they no longer have 
 
23  Ibid at 406. 
24  Ibid at 407. 
25  Ibid at 408. 
26  Ibid. 
27  Ibid. 
28  Anika Gauja, Political Parties, and Elections: Legislating for Representative Democracy (Routledge, 2016) at 19–
23. 
29  Ibid at 20. 
30  Ibid at 21. 
31  Ibid at 22. 
32  Ibid. 
33  Ibid at 23. 
34  Ananda B Kusuma, Sistem pemerintahan" pendiri negara" versus sistem presidensiel" orde reformasi" (Badan 
Penerbit Fakultas Hukum, Universitas Indonesia, 2011) at 102. 
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membership status in that institution.35 Tomassen defines the right to recall a political 
party's right to withdraw parliament members who are elected through a list of 
candidates it proposes.36 
In some countries, recall is carried out on people's representatives, including 
legislative members and regional heads such as mayors and governors. Colombia is an 
example, including a recall referendum in the 1991 Constitution to address the movement 
known as "la septima papeleta."37 Latvia is another country that introduces recall.38 If one-
tenth of the voters starting a referendum in Latvia wish to withdraw Saeima (parliament), 
then recall can be implemented.39 In the Philippines, the people can withdraw local 
officials through recall. The mechanism starts with a minimum of 25% of voters in an 
area signing the petition.40 
Although there is no direct equivalent in Indonesia, the "withdrawal" mechanism 
is interpreted as the dismissal of a parliament member through Penggantian Antar Waktu 
(PAW), defined as recall, based on Article 22B the 1945 Constitution. This article states, 
"Members of the House of Representatives can be dismissed from his position, in which 
the terms and conditions of which are regulated by law. " This mechanism is further 
detailed in Article 239 of the Parliament Act,41 and Political Parties Act. 
In the context, recall aims to supervise members of political parties who are 
members of the House, which is expected to improve the House members' performance, 
accountability, and integrity.42 Its enforcement is carried out as a form of anticipation 
and supervision of the House members for disgraceful acts in political struggles over 
implementing their duties and functions. However, Denny Indrayana,  an Indonesian law 
professor, argues that the application of recall monopolized by political parties is 
contrary to rights and the right to expression. Through the recall monopolized by parties, 
party members do not represent the people but represent the political parties. It confirms 
that there is a denial of the meaning of the House as an extension of people's 
representatives and not political party representatives.43 
 
35  Mohammad Mahfud MD, “Perkembangan Politik Hukum: Studi tentang Pengaruh Konfigurasi Politik 
terhadap Produk Hukum di Indonesia” (1993) Disertasi, Pasca Sarjana Ilmu Hukum Universitas Gajah 
Mada, Yogyakarta at 324. 
36  Shubhan, supra note 10 at 46. 
37  La septima papeleta is defined as a call from the Colombian people for constitutional reform to end 
violence, narcotics-related terrorism, corruption, and increasing citizen indifference. Yanina Welp & 
Juan Pablo Milanese, “Playing by the rules of the game: partisan use of recall referendums in Colombia” 
(2018) 25:8 Democratization 1379–1396 at 1389. 
38  Andrzej Jackiewicz, “Instytucja Recall na \Lotwie” (2018) 2 (42) Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego 69–
82 at 71. 
39  Ibid. 
40  Julio Teehankee, “Electoral Politics in the Philippines” (2002) Electoral Politics in Southeast and East 
Asia 149–202 at 152. 
41  Recall can be accomplished when the House members: (a) die; (b) resign as a member at own request 
in writing; and (c) proposed by the political party concerned to resign. 
42  Shubhan, supra note 10 at 34. 
43  Ibid at 35. 





Historically, the first recall policy was introduced in 1969, in Act Number 16 of 1969 
on the Parliament Act. Article 13 of this Act became the legitimate basis for dismissing 
the parliament members from their tenure. Meanwhile, the right to recall is attached to 
the organizations participating in the election as Article 43 paragraph (1) of this Act that 
states the right to change delegates or organizations participating in the elections in a 
consultative body or people's representatives lies with the election organization 
concerned and in terms of its implementation, it must first deliberate, with the 
leadership of the consultative body or people's representatives. 
In its continuities, demands for repealing recall have emerged. This emergence 
considers the possible decline in the people's critical representatives to have even 
resulted in the House members' fear of voicing people's aspirations.44 In the end, based 
on Act Number 2 of 1999 on Political Parties and Act Number 4 of 1999 on the Parliament 
Act, a recall was successfully eliminated, except for reasons that could not be avoided, 
such as passing away, resigning, or being sentenced with a criminal penalty. However, 
after House members cannot be dismissed, it has adverse implications for the House 
institution. House members who behave in a disgraceful manner are involved in 
corruption cases, immoral acts, and drug abuse.45 Then, as an effort to overcome this 
situation, in Act Number 22 of 2002 on Parliament and Act Number 2 of 2011 on Political 
Parties, the recall had revived in which the practice submitted to the respective political 
parties' leadership.46 Then, recall set out in the subsequent Parliament Act, whose 
practice remains under respective political parties. Of course, this is very unfortunate 
due to exempt people or citizens to participate in proposing recall. To be sure, citizens 
are substantially eligible to be part of this procedure because their representatives are 
part of the reciprocity in a participatory democracy. 
It is inevitable that recall in practice results in a more adverse political system. 
recall opens new political voids in which there will be more spaces for political parties 
to impose recall for their members under controversial reasons.47 For example, the recall 
for Lily Wahid by Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB) was deemed to have violated the party's 
provisions. While on the other hand, it was the party that supported the Century Bank 
case's investigation through the House's inquiry right.48 Lily Wahid's attitude was an 
attempt to thoroughly convey the people's will to investigate the Century Bank case 
through these House functions. However, in other cases, recall raises the practice of 
collusion, such as in the case of Harun Masiku in early 2020.49 
 
44  Moh Mahfud, Perdebatan Hukum Tata Negara: Pasca Amandemen Konstitusi (LP3ES, 2007) at 167. 
45  Ibid at 168. 
46  Ibid at 169. 
47  Rauf, Bunga & Djanggih, supra note 4 at 16. 
48  Republika, “DPP PKB Recall Lily Wahid dan Effendy Choirie | Republika Online," online: 
<https://republika.co.id/berita/breaking-news/nasional/11/03/14/169326-dpp-pkb-recall-lily-wahid-
dan-effendy-choirie>. 
49  “Kasus Harun Masiku, Kader PDIP Didakwa Suap Rp600 Juta”, online: 
<https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20200402135522-12-489583/kasus-harun-masiku-kader-
pdip-didakwa-suap-rp600-juta>. 
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Recall, in several ways, is believed to influence the eradication of corruption.50 
Corruption can be defined as behavior that deviates from formal ethical rules regarding 
a person's actions in a position of public authority due to motives for personal 
considerations, such as wealth, power, and status. According to Yves Meny, corruption 
consists of shortcut corruption, tribute corruption, contract corruption, and extortion 
corruption.51 
First, bypass corruption is often practiced in embezzlement cases of state funds, 
economic and political intermediaries, where the economic sector pays for political gain. 
Second, tribute corruption due to strategic positions, and thanks to these positions, a 
person gets a percentage of several activities in several fields. Third, contract corruption, 
inseparable from efforts to obtain projects or markets. It includes in the category of 
efforts to get facilities from the government. Fourth, extortion corruption, related to 
security guarantees and matters of internal and external turmoil.52 Amien Rais divides 
the four types of corruption in Indonesia. First, extortionate corruption, referring to a 
situation where a person is forced to 'bribe' to get something or protect his rights and 
needs. Second, manipulative corruption is a type of bribery that refers to a person's dirty 
efforts to influence policymakers or government decisions to obtain the maximum 
benefit. Third, nepotistic corruption, a type of bribery, refers to the preferential treatment 
given to family or someone close to them. Fourth, subsection corruption, in the form of 
theft of state assets by state officials through abuse of their power.53 
If the types and types of corruption above are related to Indonesia's phenomena, 
especially in representative institutions, then the critical thing that must be paid 
attention to is efforts to minimize political corruption. Scheppele said that political 
corruption occurs when what is harmed is the wider community's interests, while 
personal politics occurs through acts of personal relaxation and only individuals suffer 
losses. Meanwhile, Sartori states that political corruption has reached the point of 
destroying politics.54 
Eradicating corruption after the constitutional reform is a point of dealing with 
increasingly widespread corruption by defining it as extraordinary crime.55 The status of 
corruption as an extraordinary crime means that corruption has entered into all areas of 
life. To respond to this behavior, the government should thoroughly carry out a series of 
improvements to the corruption eradication system. System combating corruption 
within the legal framework is closely related to improving the legal system to combat 
corruption, including three essential elements: structure, substance, and legal culture. 
The structure is defined as the entire existing legal institutions and their enforcing 
 
50  Rauf, Bunga & Djanggih, supra note 4 at 16. 
51  HM Arsyad Sanusi, “Relasi Antara Korupsi dan Kekuasaan” (2009) Jurnal Konstitusi 83–104 at 84–85. 
52  Ibid at 86. 
53  Ibid. 
54  Denny Indrayana, Negeri Para Mafioso: Hukum di Sarang Koruptor (Penerbit Buku Kompas, 2008) at 146–
147. 
55  I GM Nurdjana, Sistem Hukum Pidana dan Bahaya Laten Korupsi: Perspektif Tegaknya Keadilan Melawan Mafia 
Hukum (Pustaka Pelajar, 2010) at 134. 





officers. The substance is defined as the fundamental rules, norms, and legal principles, 
both written and unwritten, and legal culture in the form of opinions, habits of thinking, 
and acting of law enforcers and community members related to the law.56 
Even though corruption is classified as an extraordinary crime,57 the actual attitude 
is still far from the expectation that it is limited to treating it as an ordinary crime.58 
Meanwhile, the handling of corruption in state institutions internally has not been 
carried out correctly.59 Supposedly, responsive corruption eradication should rely on 
formally eradicating corruption, which is the Attorney General's Office's duty and 
authority and the Commission of the Eradication of Corruption or Komisi Pemberantasan 
Korupsi (KPK). However, it also deals with every party's obligation, including each state 
institution, carried out internally, especially in preventing corruption.    
 
 
III. RECALL AND ITS PARADOX FOR THE ANTI-CORRUPTION AGENDA 
The shift in the meaning of corruption as an extraordinary crime means that corruption 
is a serious crime, requiring all parties' involvement in eradicating, both internally and 
externally, in state institutions. One of the parties that have played a significant role in 
eradicating corruption, apart from the Public Attorney and the KPK, is the House. The 
House is an institution with strong legitimacy and acts in the name of the people's 
interests.60 Even though in reality, the House's role and functions are still not fully 
confirm with democracy due to the more rampant rate of corruption comes within the 
House.61 As a result, the House, which should represent the people’s interests, arguably 
stands under the parties’ interests, even if this institution is primarily dedicated to 
representing people's interests.62 Article 1 paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution 
outlines that sovereignty is in the people's hands. It is exercised according to the 
constitution, which implies that the people as the party have the highest power in 
 
56  Lawrence M Friedman, The Legal System: A Social Science Perspective (Russell Sage Foundation, 1975) at 15–
17. 
57  In the Indonesia legal system, ‘extraordinary crime’ is extracted from the term most serious crimes in 
the Rome Statute. This term then develops more widely and is introduced to the cases of terrorism, 
corruption, drug abuse offenses, and sexual abuse of children in the laws and regulations. The 
Constitutional Court has used this term through its decision Number: 2/PUU-V/2007 and Number  
3/PUU-V/2007. Vidya Prahassacitta, “The Concept of Extraordinary Crime in Indonesia Legal System: 
is The Concept An Effective Criminal Policy?” (2016) 7:4 Humaniora 513–521 at 513. 
58  ‘Ordinary crime' is the general term as outlined in the Indonesian Criminal  Code. The difference 
between ordinary and extraordinary crimes is the consequences of the preparation and formulation of 
legislation as part of the correctional policy.  Harry Blagg, Crime, Aboriginality and the Decolonisation of 
Justice (Federation Press, 2016) at 74. 
59  Septiana Dwiputrianti, “Memahami Strategi Pemberantasan Korupsi di Indonesia” (2009) 6:3 Jurnal 
Ilmu Administrasi: Media Pengembangan Ilmu dan Praktek Administrasi 01 at 13. 
60  Andi Gau Kadir, “Transparansi Legislatif dalam Lembaga Perwakilan Rakyat” (2008) 1:1 Jurnal 
Administrasi dan Kebijakan Kesehatan Indonesia 35–40 at 39. 
61  Indrayana, supra note 54 at 114. 
62  Sebastian Salang, “Parlemen: Antara Kepentingan Politik vs Aspirasi Rakyat” (2006) 3:4 Jurnal 
Konstitusi 90–120 at 96. 
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Indonesian politics whose implementation must be based on the constitution 
(constitutional democracy).63  
Indeed, the representative institution is prominent in modern democracy. The 
political process cannot be carried out directly by the people considering the number of 
territorial coverage and technical problems in government implementation.64 However, 
in any democratic country, efforts are always required to build a representative system 
that allows representatives to properly carry out their representative duties and 
functions.65 So, a representative institution that can carry out its representative function 
properly is an effective way of channeling its people's aspirations in a democratic 
country. On the other hand, democracy needs a space to convey criticism and suggestions 
for all societal elements, to realize effective public communication.66 Based on this 
effective communication, the expressed public aspirations become parameters and 
considerations of public policy, which is hereinafter known as the conception of 
deliberative democracy. 
When related to this reality, the House's functions are still not directly 
proportional to the meaning and essence of democracy, as mentioned above. The nature 
of democracy is interpreted substantively that the people hold trusted sovereignty 
through their responsibility to oversee the government's running.67 A further legal 
arrangement is needed for the people to act on violations committed by the House 
members. On the other hand, the above statement relates to the House's oversight 
function for government checks and balances. However, the problem is, if the House has 
a supervisory position, then what about the supervision for the House? Meanwhile, the 
1945 Constitution and other laws and regulations do not yet regulate provisions 
regarding House members' oversight mechanisms. Excessive power is the basis for 
corruption. This, as Lord Acton said, "power tends to corrupt, but absolute power is 
corrupt absolutely."68 
In the rule of law, a legal mechanism is vital to protect citizens and hold the House 
members accountable in carrying out their duties, powers, and functions.69 C.F. Strong 
argues that if citizens have the right to elect their representatives, they should also have 
the right to dismiss their representatives.70 Meanwhile, as an implication of the rule of 
law, of course, recall needs to be regulated through laws relating to citizens' rights to 
supervise, maintain and uphold the honor, dignity, and behavior of their representatives. 
Besides, it is necessary to have provisions regulating citizens' rights to bring their 
 
63  Khairul Fahmi, “Prinsip Kedaulatan Rakyat dalam Penentuan Sistem Pemilihan Umum Anggota 
Legislatif” (2016) 7:3 Jurnal Konstitusi 119–160 at 123. 
64  Dede Sri Kartini, “Demokrasi dan Pengawas Pemilu” (2017) 2:2 Journal of Governance at 3. 
65  Abdul Bari Azed, “Sistem Pemilu di Indonesia” (2017) 17:2 Jurnal Hukum & Pembangunan 170–180 at 
175. 
66  Kacung Marijan, Sistem Politik Indonesia: Konsolidasi Demokrasi Pasca-Orde Baru (Kencana, 2019) at 75. 
67  Salang, “Parlemen”, supra note 62 at 97. 
68  Miriam Budiarjo, “Hak Asasi Manusia dalam Dimensi Global” (1990) 10 Jurnal Ilmu Politik at 172. 
69  Paimin Napitupulu, Peran dan Pertanggungjawaban DPR (Alumni, 2005) at 144. 
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representatives to court if there is an alleged violation of the law in the form of treason 
against the state, corruption, and other serious crimes. It means that citizens have the 
right to propose a recall of their representatives through laws. 
 
 
IV. PARTICIPATIVE RECALL: A PROPOSAL 
A. Constituent Recall 
The current recall in Indonesia is relatively simple. It is enough that the central 
leadership council of the political parties submits a proposal to the House. Then, the 
House forwards the recommendation to the President to issue a presidential decree. The 
President and the House, in this case, can be likened to just a letterbox and ratification. 
This is because neither the House nor the President can reject the proposal. 
Consequently, decision-making by the House and the President is only administrative. 
This substantial authority of the political party raises the question, is it true that the 
political party can revoke the House member's mandate who has been given thousands 
of constituents. Moreover, it violates the Articles of Association or Bylaws or Anggaran 
Dasar/Anggaran Rumah Tangga (AD/ART), which are often unclear.  
Although many parties have questioned this, the Constitutional Court in Decision 
Number 008/PUU-IV/2006 stated that recall did not violate the constitution. According 
to the Constitutional Court, one of the efforts to empower political parties is to provide 
the right or authority to impose actions in enforcing discipline against their members, so 
that members behave and act in ways that do not deviate. Moreover, it contradicts the 
AD/ART. The Constitutional Court is worried that if the political party is not given the 
authority to impose sanctions on its members who deviate from the AD/ART or the 
party's policies, the party members will be free to act arbitrarily.71  
In this context, this mechanism should not be the monopoly of the political parties.  
Rather, the constituents should have the same. Recall by political parties tends to 
strengthen the political parties dominant over their party members so that members of 
the parliament are more concerned with their parties' interests rather than conveying the 
people's aspirations. The council member concerned will be afraid of recall, which may 
be imposed on him at any time. Thus, according to Laica, former Constitutional Judge, 
the parliament became unstable and unstable, controlled by an elite of political parties 
from outside.72 The House member may not be removed from office by being withdrawn 
by his political party's leader to have different opinions with his political party's 
leadership. So, it is a denial of the legal relationship between the House members and 
constituents and state institutions, which should obey the constitution.   
In discussing recall, the most appropriate form is a constituent recall. In this form, 
the proposal for recall can come from members of the House members' electoral area 
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concerned.73 Thus, every people's representative can genuinely serve the interests of the 
people he represents, including that his position can also be protected from the 
possibility of being threatened by his political party's leadership because of the idealism 
championed for the people. The existing alternation mechanism between times can even 
be said to deviate from the fourth principle of Pancasila, which requires three crucial 
elements: people's sovereignty, deliberation, and its implementation is carried out wisely 
in the concept of representative democracy.74 The foundation of the people's right to 
participate in each political phase of their representatives is based on the right to develop 
society, nation, and the state as provided by Article 28C paragraph (2) of the 1945 
Constitution, everyone has the right to advance himself in fighting for his rights 
collectively to build society, nation, and country.   
Jimly Asshidiqie, the Indonesian leading legal scholar, also believes that recall 
should be reviewed so that replacing the existing system with the party recall adopted 
by the constituent recall will be an alternative for policymakers.75 Once it has been 
accomplished, people's representatives do not become the butt of internal political 
turmoil in parties that tend to be arbitrary following the wishes of those who hold power 
and have the most influence. It aims to prevent disparity in positions because of the 
imbalance of power between the representatives and constituents who elect them. An 
active decision is needed to place a recall on citizens to form a more reciprocal 
interaction. It is as emphasized by Held that in the relationship of representative 
democracy, there must be an equalization "playing field" between the representatives of 
the people and the political constituents.76 He also continued that elections should 
require elements of "freedom" and "equality," both of which are in line with the concept 
of constituent recall.77 
Constituent recall links to the five criteria of democratic governance, as coined by 
Dahl. First, in terms of effective participation, all society members must have an effective 
opportunity to give their opinions and views before a policy is implemented.78 
mechanism constituent recall can make this happen because community participation is 
shorter and more direct. In other words, the people's representatives' accountability can 
be more easily scrutinized and demanded by the public if it is not mediated by a political 
party that has its agenda and interests in political play. Second, in terms of equality of 
votes, every community member has the same opportunity to vote, and each vote must 
be considered equally.79 If the people think that the vote they have cast for a people's 
representative is not appropriate, then the constituent recall mechanism can be a voice 
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74  Hasanah, supra note 9 at 11. 
75  Jimly Asshiddiqie, Menegakkan Etika Penyelenggara Pemilu (PT RajaGrafindo Persada, 2013) at 67–69. 
76  Allison L Held, Sheryl L Herndon & Danielle M Stager, “The Equal Rights Amendment: Why the 
ERA Remains Legally Viable and Properly Before the States” (1997) 3 Wm & Mary J Women & L 113 
at 19. 
77  Ibid. 
78  Robert A Dahl, On Democracy (Yale University Press, 2008) at 375. 
79  Ibid. 





for the people in another form. Third, in terms of a clear understanding of relevant 
alternative policies,80 the constituent recall will encourage people to be more active in 
studying relevant alternative policies. The level of accountability can be higher because 
constituent recall applications can also encourage people's representatives to improve 
their performance in formulating policies. Fourth, in terms of monitoring the agenda,81 
Constituent recall can be a model for monitoring by the people so that state policies 
remain open and under the people's control, not merely a product of political party 
games.   
 
B. Participatory Recall Through Judiciary 
The basic understanding is that if citizens have the right to elect their representatives, 
they should have the right to propose recall. This dismissal is not only left to political 
parties but also citizens. Likewise, if the grant of voting rights for citizens over their 
representatives is regulated per the law, then their dismissal mechanism must also be 
regulated through a legal instrument, at the court. At the same time, it is a criticism of 
the House members' current recall, which should also be settled through the court. In the 
rule of law, all problems must be resolved according to and through the law.82 
On the other hand, the relationship between recall and efforts to eradicate 
corruption is related to alleged violations by citizens, so the people have the legal 
position to propose the House members' dismissal.83 Simultaneously, it can prevent the 
application of a recall carried out for reasons of political parties' interests. Therefore the 
arrangement recall in dismissing the House members must go through the judiciary.84 
This mechanism will run effectively if the public can actively and critically carry out the 
House's duties and authorities to eradicate corruption that can be carried out through 
the Constitutional Court and the General Court (KPK-Tipikor Court). It will have 
implications for improving the functions of legislation, supervision, and budgeting, 
namely that the House and the President's legislative products will have better quality 
and can seriously supervise and prepare the budget and prevent abuse of power.   
The settlement of recall needs to be attached to the Constitutional Court's power, 
as an institution claimed to guard democracy and the constitution. The resolution of 
alleged violations by the President and/or the House's vice president is the 
Constitutional Court's competence. The House is another institution that has the same 
position as the President under the separation of power. It is arguable for the future 
debate that the House members can be proposed to be dismissed by citizens of the 
Constitutional Court on suspicion of violating the law, to maintain the dignity and 
behavior of the House members. It takes into account that the Constitutional Court is 
the independent institution that accords to the rule of law so that it will be eligible for 
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having more powers in response to the problems in formulating the appropriate 
alternative for recall. 
The provision on the President and/or Vice President's dismissal is critical to 
evaluate, particularly regarding the process recall for the House members to continue to 
respect court decisions to implement the rule of law. Thus, the executorial power of the 
Constitutional Court decision in proposing the dismissal of the House members must be 
binding since it is pronounced at a plenary session open to the public. Thus, several legal 
arrangements must be addressed as a form of legal harmonization, so that the regulation 
on recall does not have a conflict of norms in statutory regulations. Harmonization of the 
law will provide legal certainty about the recall. This legal harmonization is related to 
replacing the House members between time in the Parliament Act. Regarding the change 
between times, as regulated in this provision, it is necessary to be improved and several 
articles to be harmonized so that the implementation of the application arrangement 




As introduced in the Parliament Act, the existing contentious recall policy has become a 
crucial challenge to promote Indonesian democracy and the anti-corruption agenda. 
There have been several cases that assert the current policy is problematic, so that recall 
needs an option to ensure that recall will work as expected. The option should include 
constituents to propose recall, which will disrupt the existing parties' domination, 
resulted in a more participatory system, and it reflects the more reciprocal ways to link 
people, parties, and the House in Indonesian politics. The judiciary's role is another 
crucial aspect to highlight, in which the process and settlement of the recall may involve 
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